Burundi

The Kingdom of Burundi also known as Kingdom of Urundi (Kirundi: Ubwami bw'Urundi), was a Bantu kingdom in the modern-day Republic of Burundi. The Ganwa monarchs (with the title of mwami) ruled over both Hutus and Tutsis.

The date of the foundation of the Kingdom of Burundi is unknown, and the exact context of the state's foundation are disputed. The region was originally inhabited by Twa hunter-gatherers before the influx of Bantu farmers from about the 11th century. The valleys and hills became home to a patchwork of farmers, fishermen, and foragers. Pastoralists (associated with cattle) arrived in waves. Based on societal and oral traditions, it is generally believed that the region's pastoralists were the ancestors of the later Tutsi ethnic group, while the agriculturalists became the Hutus, however the exact origins of Burundi's ethnic groups remain unclear and disputed. Many local and regional dynasties developed, eventually coalescing around two political centres; one in the north and one in the south.

The Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi peoples have lived in Burundi for at least 500 years. For more than 200 of those years, Burundi was an independent kingdom. In 1885, it became part of the German colony of German East Africa. After the First World War and Germany's defeat, the League of Nations mandated the territories of Burundi and neighbouring Rwanda to Belgium in a combined territory called Rwanda-Urundi. After the Second World War, this transformed into a United Nations Trust Territory.

Burundi gained independence in 1962 and initially retained the monarchy. However, a coup d'état in 1966 replaced the monarchy with a one-party republic, and for the next 27 years, Burundi was ruled by a series of ethnic Tutsi dictators and notably experienced a genocide of its Hutu population in 1972. 

Burundi remains primarily a rural society, with just 13.4% of the population living in urban areas in 2019. The country is densely populated, and many young people emigrate in search of opportunities elsewhere. Roughly 81% of the population are of Hutu ethnic origin, 18% are Tutsi, and fewer than 1% are Twa. The official languages of Burundi are Kirundi, French, and English—Kirundi being officially recognised as the sole national language. English was made an official language in 2014.

Gitega, formerly Kitega, is the country's political capital. Located in the centre of the country, in the Burundian central plateau roughly 62 kilometres (39 mi) east of Bujumbura, the largest city and former political capital, Gitega is the country's fourth largest city and former royal capital of the Kingdom of Burundi until its abolition in 1966.

Bujumbura, formerly Usumbura, is the economic capital, former political capital, largest city and main port. Bujumbura grew from a small village after it became a military post in German East Africa in 1889. After World War I it was made the administrative centre and de facto capital of the Belgian League of Nations mandate of Ruanda-Urundi. The name was changed from Usumbura to Bujumbura upon Burundi's independence in 1962.

The Port of Bujumbura is the largest port on Lake Tanganyika. Burundi depends on neighbouring countries for access to the ocean. Goods may be carried by road via Rwanda, or by the lake and then by road or rail via Tanzania, Congo or Zambia. 80% of Burundi's external trade is carried via the last three routes, using the Port of Bujumbura. The port manages receipt and delivery of exports and imports, whether carried by ship or by truck. As of 2011 more than 90% of cargo handled was imports, of which about 60% entered by ship and 40% by truck.

I shall do a different post focused on the Burundi drumming tradition.

Also, I should be passing through Bujumbura in September, 2026. I've got this East Africa tour lined up.

Grok yet again

"The X post promotes a personal blog entry questioning reparations for Africa's role in the transatlantic slave trade, highlighting African kingdoms' complicity in capturing and selling about 90% of the 12-15 million enslaved people to Europeans between the 15th and 19th centuries.

Drawing on historical examples like the Kingdom of Dahomey and Niger Delta traders, the author argues Africans should apologize to descendants of the enslaved rather than demand compensation for the trade itself, while supporting reparations for colonial exploitation.

This perspective challenges the victim-only narrative in ongoing discussions, such as Ghana's upcoming March 2026 UN resolution to declare the slave trade a crime against humanity and seek redress from former colonial powers."

Here https://thingsifeelstronglyabout.blogspot.com/2026/01/reparations-for-africa.html

Things I Feel Strongly About: My Sleepwalker

Things I Feel Strongly About: My Sleepwalker: The phone on my desk rang. It was Silla from reception asking if I was available to see a client who was very upset and wanted to see someon...

Azande warriors chose boys as wives

Why the Azande warriors of North Central Africa chose boys as wives in the 1800s

By Mildred Europa Taylor, June 1, 2018

Former Zimbabwean leader Robert Mugabe once described homosexuality as “un-African” and a “white disease.”

Other African leaders, plus several other people on the continent have shared in his view, and this has elicited homophobia, persecution and anti-gay laws in countries like Uganda, Tanzania, Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya.

In recent years, it has been made clear that same-sex sexual relations existed in traditional African societies even before the colonisers arrived.

From the 16th century, homosexuality has been recorded in Africa by European missionaries and anthropologists.

An example of this is the boy-wives’ tradition of the Azande ethnic group of North Central Africa.

Formed in the 19th century, the Azande people were a warrior tribe mostly found in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

These warriors were not only practising homosexuality and bi-sexuality but actually married boys or young men.

According to anthropologist E.E. Evans-Pritchard, there was a scarcity of women for these warriors, particularly, the poorer ones at the time due to social traditions.

As such, men or warriors who were against masturbation were expected to marry boys and satisfy their sexual needs with them.

A warrior who is ready for this would select a boy between the ages of 12-20, go to his parents’ house and request the boy’s hand in marriage.

He would have to pay a bride price for the boy, usually in the form of spears or other items.

Once married, the husband would then have to take care of the boy's parents, who are now his in-laws.

The boy would also take on household duties like a woman, including collecting firewood, fetching water and holding the warrior shield when travelling.

"At night the boy slept with his lover, who had intercourse with him between his thighs (intercrural). (Azande expressed disgust at the suggestion of anal penetration). The boys got what pleasure they could by the friction of their organs on the husband’s belly or groin.

“However, even though there was this side to the relationship, it was clear from Zande accounts that there was also the comfort of a night sharing of the bed with a companion,” Evans-Pritchard wrote in his work published in early 20th century.

Note that, the warriors of the Zande people were not the only ones practising this; young princes were also involved. 

If a boy appealed to a Zande prince, the prince would take on the boy as a servant and a sexual outlet. The prince would also compensate the boy’s family.

There were men who had female wives but also married boys. During wars, they took the boys with them to perform duties at base camp.

One interesting fact is that unlike instances of homosexuality, sex between Azande men did not have much to do with love and longer unions. They only wanted sexual gratification, companionship and service.

Marriage to a woman was still what they hoped for. They just loved boys because women were scarce. 7

Besides, the husbands would eventually marry women, and the cycle would continue with the former boy-wife following the same direction.

This tradition ended in the early 20th. century, Evans-Pritchard noted.

Source: Why the Azande Warriors of North Central Africa Chose Boys as Wives in the 1800s

More details: The Boy Wives of the Azande of the Sudan

My own humble contribution at this point is that we cannot know for sure that there was no romance involved in every single case of same-sex marriage between Azande men. From what we know of human sexuality, this would have been highly unlikely. The Azande knew very well that some men preferred to have sex with other men. And although every man was expected to marry a woman, Azande customs provided a man with an excuse to have sex with another man whenever he wanted, throughout life. Marriage between warriors and recruits was only a part of the Azande accommodation to male homosexuality.

Azande warriors — Pinterest

Evans-Pritchard with Azande boys during his field trip 1926-9

Kingsley's Crossing

"In the developed world illegal immigration is a hotly debated political issue. Form the eyes of the world's very poor, it is an excruciating personal decision, made to make life a little bit better for one's self and one's family.

Kingsley is 23 years old, and lives in a two-room house with his parents and seven siblings in a coastal village in Cameroon. He is raised with an image of Europe as a kind of promised land: if he can only get there, life for himself and his family will improve.

Photojournalist Olivier Jobard introduces us to Kingsley as he makes the difficult decision to embark on his "mission" and then accompanies him, documenting his perilous journey, Step by step, across desert and ocean, we come to see immigration through one man's eyes, and learn the rewards - and the costs - of such a dream."

MediaStorm February 21, 2014

On Talibés and Almajirai

The talibés in Senegal and almajirai (plural of almajiri) in Nigeria are remarkably similar. Both groups consist of young boys sent away from their rural families to live in urban residential Islamic schools, where traditional practices have increasingly devolved into systemic street begging and child exploitation.

Both are rooted in traditional Islamic boarding systems—called daaras in Senegal and tsangaya or almajiri schools in Northern Nigeria—where students focus intensely on memorising the Quran under a religious teacher (maramu or mallam).

Parents typically send their young sons (often starting at age 4 to 7) away from impoverished countryside villages to major cities, trusting they will receive a pious religious upbringing. Rather than being fully provided for by their teachers or communities, many of these children are mandated to spend hours each day roaming the streets to meet daily quotas for money or food.

International bodies and NGOs classify the systemic neglect, lack of formal secular education, malnutrition, and forced labour surrounding both groups as severe child protection and welfare crises.

The systems of both the Talibés in Senegal and the Almajirai in Nigeria began as highly respected, community-supported networks for higher Islamic education. Over centuries, economic pressures, colonisation, and rapid urbanisation transformed them from prestigious academic traditions into the marginalised systems seen today.

The Almajiri System in Nigeria, Pre-Colonial Prestige: The word almajiri comes from the Arabic al-Muhajirun, meaning "the emigrant." It historically referred to students who travelled to gain knowledge. In the pre-colonial Kanem-Bornu Empire and Sokoto Caliphate, these schools were elite institutions. They produced the region’s judges, clerks, and scholars. The traditional schools (tsangaya) were heavily subsidised by the ruling emirs, wealthy patrons, and the local community through zakat (charitable giving). Students did not need to beg because the community willingly fed and clothed them as a religious duty.

The British Disruption: In 1904, the British colonial administration conquered Northern Nigeria. They abolished state funding for Islamic schools and refused to recognise them legally. At the same time, they introduced a Western-style secular school system that required fees, which most poor Muslim families rejected. Deprived of state financial support, teachers (mallams) and their students lost their livelihoods. To survive, schools migrated to urban commercial centres, and students were forced to work or beg for food and charity, transforming a system of prestigious scholarship into a survival mechanism.

The Talibé System in Senegal, Pre-Colonial Integration: In Senegal, traditional Islamic schools (daaras) were deeply integrated into rural agrarian societies. Young boys (talibés, from the Arabic talib, meaning "student") studied the Quran under a religious teacher (marabout). Historically, talibés did not beg for money on city streets. Instead, they worked alongside their marabout on communal agricultural land, growing food to feed the school. This labour was viewed as character-building, teaching the boys humility, discipline, and the value of hard work.

The French colonial administration in Senegal marginalised traditional daaras, choosing to fund and promote French secular schools instead. This isolated the Islamic schools economically, restricting them to rural areas. During the 1970s and 1980s, severe droughts devastated West African agriculture, making rural farming unsustainable. Desperate marabouts moved their daaras into large cities like Dakar to survive. Lacking land to farm and unable to afford city life, the teachers adapted the traditional labour model, sending children onto urban streets to beg for daily cash and food quotas.

Equivalent systems and student populations are found in Niger, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d'Ivoire.

While colonial education policies are a major historical catalyst, they are not the sole ultimate cause for the widespread street begging associated with almajirai (in Nigeria) and talibés (in Senegal/West Africa). Widespread rural poverty leads many families to send children away to daaras or tsangaya schools because they cannot afford to feed them at home. In addition, secular post-colonial governments often failed to integrate or properly regulate traditional religious schools, leaving a legal vacuum where abusive teachers can exploit children for economic gain. What was historically a minor or non-systemic practice of enduring hardship or seeking alms has morphed in urban environments into commercialised, forced begging managed by exploitative networks.

Both Senegal and Nigeria have introduced several legal reforms, modern curriculum integrations, and bans on street begging to address these crises. However, enforcing these laws remains incredibly difficult due to political pressure, deep-rooted cultural traditions, and severe enforcement gaps. In Nigeria particularly, the federal government launched major initiatives to build "Model Islamic Schools" (Tsangaya schools). These schools fuse traditional Quranic memorisation with basic English, mathematics, and vocational training, funded by the state, to eliminate the financial need for begging. But neither government has the budget or infrastructure to house, feed, and formally educate the millions of children who rely on these systems for shelter. Also, many rural, conservative parents still distrust state-run secular schools, viewing them as elite institutions that do not teach moral values.

In Northern Nigeria, the almajiri system is deeply scrutinised as a critical national security concern. Security analysts and organisations like the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) highlight how the system functions as a vulnerability pipeline. With an estimated 30 million out-of-school and almajiri children in Nigeria, violent non-state actors like Boko Haram, ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province), and northern bandit groups look to these children as prime recruitment pools.

While the system itself does not inherently teach violent extremism, it produces hundreds of thousands of boys who grow up experiencing severe poverty, isolation, and a lack of parental love or state support. When they outgrow the schools, they often have no secular education, no literacy, or job skills, leaving them economically desperate and susceptible to the financial and ideological promises of insurgent groups.

Also, because almajiri children are highly visible begging on city streets, they face intense societal stigmatisation, sometimes being pejoratively labelled by the public as "urchins" or future criminals. This social exclusion deepens their detachment from the state, making anti-government insurgent narratives more appealing.

Ref: Exploring Youth Radicalisation Within the Almajiri System in Northern Nigeria

Talibés beg in Senegal's St Louis's main market. The boys can spend up to 10 hours on the streets in search of food and money, with severe beatings awaiting some. Photo by Pete Pattison/The Guardian